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RAILROAD AUDITS:
SOME ARRIVED AHEAD OF SCHEDULE
Abstract: Through 1975, the shareholder annual reports of publicly-
owned U.S. railroads were exempt from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s accounting regulations, audit and disclosure rules 
because railroads were common carriers subject to the rules and 
regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).    Pub-
licly-owned Class railroads voluntary began to away from ICC-type 
towards GAAP-type accounting and disclosures in their shareholder 
reports just after World War II.1 This paper reviews early industry 
practices with respect to internal and external audits. Using a sample 
of major Class I railroads from 1946 to 1975, the paper shows:  the 
extent to which  certain railroads voluntarily presented audited finan-
cial statements before being required, the extent to which particular 
CPA firms were involved with the railroad industry, and the types of 
audit reports that issued to  these  railroads during this period. 
INTRODUCTION
For much of the 20th century, the annual reports to share-
holders of publicly-owned railroads in the U.S. were unique. 
While other publicly-owned corporations, including regulated 
electric and telephone utility companies, were required to follow 
the accounting regulations and the disclosure rules prescribed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in their an-
nual reports to shareholders, railroads were exempt.
Railroads had long been considered common carriers sub-
ject to the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce 
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Accounting Historians and two anonymous referees for their comments on  ear-
lier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Commission (ICC). Among other things, the ICC specified the 
accounting used by railroads and required them to file monthly, 
quarterly and annual reports with the commission. The ICC’s 
regulation of the railroads pre-dated the establishment of the 
SEC by almost 50 years. Congress recognized the extent of the 
ICC’s oversight when it passed the 1933 and 1934 Securities 
Acts, by specifically exempting railroads and their publicly trad-
ed securities from regulation by the SEC. On the other hand, 
interstate utility holding companies, with subsidiaries in the 
electric utility and retail distribution of natural gas businesses, 
were subjected to direct SEC regulation under the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935 [Feeney, 2004].
This paper begins with a historical review of how auditing 
procedures were first applied to railroad accounting and their 
financial statements. Railroads of the mid 1800s made extensive 
use of internal and traveling auditors, and their reports often 
were included in the annual reports to shareholders. Later, when 
the public accounting profession developed at the end of the 
nineteenth century, railroads were among the first companies 
to utilize outside accountants to audit their books on a regular 
basis. Evidence is provided of an 1898 railroad audit by a CPA 
firm that seems to predate the acknowledged first external au-
dit of any industrial or commercial company in the U.S. The 
paper also looks at the on-going efforts of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) to encourage railroads to voluntarily include 
audited financial statements in their shareholder annual reports. 
Jumping ahead, the particular railroads for this study were 
selected from a leading investment guide from 1946. The annual 
reports for these 30 publicly-owned Class I railroads were then 
reviewed for the 1946 to 1975 time period. There were several 
reasons for selecting this time period. First, Feeney (2004) ob-
served that the format and content of railroad annual reports 
began to change after World War II. By the mid-1970s, the 
composition of the railroad industry had changed dramatically 
through mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies and the creation 
of non-rail, holding companies. The other reason for ending in 
1975, is that in the following year Congress passed the Rail Revi-
talization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4R Act), which 
among other things gave the SEC the authority to prescribe rail-
road accounting and reporting rules [Coyle, et al., 1986, p. 68].
The results of the study show the extent to which:
1) the railroads in the sample group voluntarily dis- 
 closed audited financial statements before they were  
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 required;
2) a small group of CPA firms were responsible for  
 most of the audits performed, and; 
3) different types of audit opinions were issued. 
Following the analysis of the results and the conclusions are the 
references for the paper. There is also an appendix showing a 
timeline of significant events affecting the railroad industry and 
its specialized accounting practices and reporting practices. 
EARLY RAILROAD AUDITS
State governments began to require railroads to file annual 
reports early in the nineteenth century. Such filings usually were 
attested under oath by the president or other executive officers. 
At that time, the concept of an external audit just did not exist. 
The creation of the U.S. railroad industry predated the establish-
ment of the public accounting profession in the United States 
by about half a century. However, the early railroads may have 
been instrumental in the development of the public accounting 
profession in the United States. Beginning in 1834, the British 
invested substantial sums in the fledgling American railroad 
industry. Some claim that British accountants, sent to examine 
the books of American railways, were responsible for the intro-
duction of modern accounting methods into the United States. 
These trips began very early on, and almost every delegation 
of British bondholders or shareholders sent in the nineteenth 
century to an American railroad in financial trouble included 
representatives of one of the large British accountancy firms 
[Adler, 1970, p. 199].
European involvement with American railroads contin-
ued through much of the 19th century. For example, much of 
original financing for the Illinois Central Railroad in the 1850s 
came from English and Dutch investors. At its peak, more than 
90% of the Illinois Central Railroad stock was held by European 
investors. As late as the years following World War I, substan-
tial numbers of Illinois Central’s shares were still traded on the 
London and Amsterdam exchanges. However, eventually most 
of these shares came back to the United States [Allston, 1992, p. 
151].
 Given the distances involved and the limited means of com-
munication for that era, it is easy to imagine the railroad’s an-
nual report was the primary source of information for its Euro-
pean investors. Indeed, during prior research, a form letter from 
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the Share and Loan Department of the London Stock Exchange 
dated April 22, 1897 was discovered. This particular form letter 
was sent to an American company requesting two copies of its 
“report and accounts” and that the Exchange be added to the 
mailing list for future mailings of “reports and accounts, circu-
lars on future issues of capital, call letters & c.”
From the 1830 annual report of the Baltimore & Ohio, it is 
known that William Woodville was appointed as “Auditor & Su-
perintendent of Transportation.” He kept the books, and exam-
ined and certified all claims or accounts against the company, 
which in many respects seems more like a controllership than 
an audit function. By corporate charter, “auditing” was done by 
a committee of the Baltimore & Ohio’s Board of Directors [Pre-
vits and Samson, 2000, p. 24]. By the mid-19th century, appoint-
ment of internal auditors among railroads was well established. 
Early railroad annual reports generally listed officers holding 
the titles of general auditor, traveling auditor, and assistant au-
ditor. The reports often contained statements by these officials 
related to the amounts so reported. Previts and Merino, in their 
comprehensive work, History of Accounting in the United States 
(1998), said it was common to find internal audit reports in 
railroad annual reports to shareholders before 1860. They also 
mentioned perhaps the first use of external accountants by the 
New Haven Railroad in 1854 to investigate fraud.
Some examples of these internal audit reports in the latter 
part of the 19th century were observed in this study from:
•	 Baltimore	&	Ohio	Railroad:	beginning	in	the	1880s,	 
 its reports included the following statement by the  
 railroad’s comptroller that “the General Balance  
 Sheet presents an accurate and true statement of the  
 accounts” as of the given date.  A similarly worded  
 statement accompanied the Baltimore & Ohio’s bal- 
 ance sheets in its annual reports through the 1950s.
•	 Michigan	Central	Railroad:	its	June	30,	1869,	report	 
 contained a statement by the auditor saying he 
 found the books to be correctly kept and supported  
 by proper vouchers;
•	 Northern	Pacific	Railroad:	 its	June	30,	1885,	report	  
 had a transmittal statement for the accounts from  
 the general auditor;
•	 New	 York,	 New	 Haven	 &	 Hartford	 Railroad:	 its	  
 Sept. 30, 1889, report had a joint attestation by its  
 two internal auditors saying the accounts were cor- 
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 rect and that the trial balance presented by the  
 treasurer was a true statement of the balances of his  
 accounts on that day.
It is not known with certainty when the first external audit 
report appeared in a railroad annual report. The earliest audit 
report seen by this writer was one from Haskins & Sells, dated 
Nov. 28, 1898, that appeared in the Reading Company report for 
the unusual period of Dec. 1, 1896 to June 30, 1898. This period 
covered the railroad’s creation and its initial operations. This 
audit report, shown in Exhibit 1, may not just be the first audit 
report for a railroad, but also could be one of the first audit re-
ports by a CPA firm for any American company as well! Another 
very early railroad audit report seen by this writer was the one 
that appeared in the Baltimore & Ohio’s 1900 Annual Report, 
which was that company’s 74th report.1
EXHIBIT 1
Although the various Companies Acts in Britain had, since 
the 1840s, required company audits there, a similar requirement 
did not develop in the United States until well into the 20th cen-
tury. Cochrane [1984] dates the first U.S. audit reports to about 
1900. However, Boockholdt [1978] quotes James Don Edwards, 
author of History of Public Accounting in the United States 
[1960], as saying the first railroad audit was done by Price Wa-
terhouse & Company of the Norfolk & Western Railroad2 after it 
1 The ICC long classified railroads into several classes. As of 1946, Class I was 
for railroads with annual revenues of $1 million or more. The annual revenue 
requirement increased during the period of study. 
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was placed into receivership in 1895. If this audit was disclosed 
in the annual report, this may well be the earliest one for any 
company. King [1998] said that one of the first sets of annual 
financial statements accompanied by an independent auditor’s 
report was the U.S. Steel annual report from 1903.3 Yet, Previts 
and Merino [1998, p. 224] show the audited condensed balance 
sheet for U.S. Steel Corp. from December 31, 1902. Perhaps, this 
paper can clear some of the confusion as to the first public com-
pany in the U.S. to issue audited financial statements.
IMPACT OF THE NYSE
One non-governmental body did impact the appearance of 
audited financial statements in railroad shareholder reports, and 
that was the NYSE. The NYSE has long listed the corporations 
whose securities were the most widely held by the American 
public. Railroads were among the first companies to have their 
stock listed on the Exchange.4 In the 1870s, railroads were the 
hot stocks just as “Dot-Coms” were the hot stocks at the end 
of the 20th century. Tremendous over speculation in railroad 
stocks resulted in the Panic of 1873, which closed the NYSE 
for ten days [NYSE, 2004].  Railroads continued to dominate 
the NYSE listings until the 1910s when the number of listed 
industrials finally exceeded the number of railroad stocks. In 
1920, 131 railroads were listed, but by 1963, there were only 58 
railroads and manufacturers of railroad equipment listed on the 
Exchange [Foulke, 1968, pp. 26-27]. 
It will be shown later that all of the railroads selected for this 
study were listed on the NYSE during the period of study. The 
NYSE also had a long history of being a positive force in the im-
provement of accounting disclosures to investors in listed compa-
nies [Chatfield and Vangermeersch, 1996, p. 434]. A  NYSE [1938] 
document described the actions taken, beginning in 1930, by its 
“Committee on Stock List” with respect to audit reports:
•	 Feb.	17,	1930:	-	Directed	that	all	future	applications	 
2 It emerged from bankruptcy the next year as the reorganized Norfolk & 
Western Railway.
3 Richard Vangermeersch had a complete collection of U.S. Steel annual re-
ports. He showed this writer the audit certificate was in U.S. Steel’s 1902 report, 
which was dated in 1903. This seems to be the 1903 report to which King referred. 
4 While this study focuses on annual reports to shareholders, it should be 
noted the railroad bonds were also listed on the NYSE as early as the 1850s. Until 
1868, railroads were the only bonds listed. In 1900, there were 879 bond issues 
listed on the NYSE and 86 percent were railroad issues [Foulke, 1968, p. 237].
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 for listing should contain auditor’s certificate.
•	 March	 2,	 1931:	 -	 Consulted	 the	 Committee	 on	 Co- 
 operation with Stock Exchanges regarding the scope  
 of auditor’s certificates.
•	 April,	1932:	Decided	to	require,	on	an	informal	basis	 
 and for a trial period that companies applying for  
 listing provide either audited statements or an  
 agreement to issue future annual reports in the au- 
 dited form.
•	 Jan.	 6,	 1933:	 -	 Publicly	 announced	 new	 require- 
 ments with respect to audits. Effective July 1, 1933,  
 all applications for listing had to be accompanied by  
 the certificate of qualified independent accountants  
 or the agreement that future reports would be so au- 
 dited.
•	 Jan.	 31,	 1931:	 -	 Sent	 letter	 to	 all	 listed	 companies	  
 asking them to request their auditor to give the Ex- 
 change detailed information about the scope and  
 character of their audit.
•	 Oct.	24,	1933:	 -	Recommended	 that	 the	basic	audit	  
 report or certificate be more informative and more  
 clearly understood by investors. 
•	 Jan.	1934:	-	Recommended,	in	conjunction	with	the	 
 American Institute of Accountants, that a uniform  
 form of auditor’s certificate accompany financial  
 statements and annual reports in listing applica- 
 tions.
While these efforts may have been a self-serving attempt to stave 
off some form of governmental regulation resulting from the 
1929 stock market crash [Previts and Merino 1998, p. 276], they 
nevertheless resulted in more companies having audited finan-
cial statements in their annual reports.
The actions taken above primarily affected newly listed 
companies and those applying for listing, but it also applied 
to existing listed companies applying to list another issue(s) of 
stock. This was the normal practice of the NYSE. By incorpo-
rating the new requirements as listed corporations made the 
application to list additional securities, the effect of the new 
requirement became cumulative [Foulke, 1968, p. 619]. How-
ever, in this case, the NYSE strongly encouraged all industrial 
companies to be audited.  By 1933, more than 90% of the listed 
industrial companies were audited, but with railroads and banks 
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it seemed to be a different situation. 
It seems that the requirements noted on above may not 
have had any impact on railroads because they were already 
listed on the Exchange and were not listing new issues of stock 
during the period of study. The NYSE later had a voluntary pro-
gram encouraging railroads to have their financials audited as 
well. By 1969, all but one (N&W) listed railroad went along with 
the recommended practice [NYSE, 1969]. Elizabeth Weinmann, 
a leading transportation analyst on Wall Street in the 1960s, 
believed that audited financial statements should be required for 
all railroads [RSMA, 1967, p. 59]. Her view was not new. In a se-
ries of articles that appeared in Journal of Accountancy in 1906 
and 1907, Thomas Warner Mitchell said that the importance 
of an independent audit of railway accounts cannot be over-
emphasized [Brief, 1986]. Apparently, little had changed in the 
intervening 60 years!
The AICPA’s Railroad Accounting Committee in 1956 noted 
that audit opinions usually stated that the railroad financial 
statements were in conformity with ICC accounting require-
ments, but failed to note that most of them were unaudited. 
The audit opinions seen in the earlier part of the period of study 
were often qualified or contained explanatory paragraphs 
because of the railroad’s treatment of specific items, such as 
deferred taxes, depreciation, and prior period adjustments. It 
should also be noted that during the period of study, the ac-
counting profession itself made several changes to the standard 
form of the audit opinion.
AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Far from trivial, the issue of presenting audited railroad 
financial statements represents rich subject matter, significant 
in its own right. Looking at this issue in terms of present day 
practice, it is hard to believe that during the 1946 to 1975 period 
(and earlier)  no law or regulation required publicly-owned rail-
roads to include audited financial statements in their sharehold-
er annual reports. Like almost everything else in the shareholder 
annual reports, this practice has its origins with the ICC, which 
did not require its Annual Report Form A to be audited. It did 
require that answers be “specific and true, and correct” and that 
the Form be made out under a sworn oath by the officer who 
controlled the railroad’s accounting. An officer found guilty of 
making a false entry, or filing a false report, could be subjected 
to civil fines and/or imprisonment.
8
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An example of officer verification from the New York Cen-
tral’s 1960 Annual Report Form A is shown on Exhibit 2. Amaz-
ingly, the form and intent of this document is almost identical to 
the certification that is now required under Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
EXHIBIT 2
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railyway
1963 Annual Report
9
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While the ICC practice was at odds with the normal audit 
requirements of the SEC for commercial or industrial compa-
nies, it was similar to the procedures followed by the IRS and 
certain government regulatory agencies with other required 
filings. On a Federal income tax return, the filer affirms, under 
the penalties of perjury, that to the best of their knowledge 
and belief, the return is true, correct and complete. A similar 
affirmation is applied to other regulatory filings made to the 
Federal and state governmental agencies. Any auditing when 
necessary was done by the IRS or the actual governmental 
agency involved. The ICC’s Bureau of Accounts was authorized 
to examine the accounting books and records for each reporting 
carrier. This power was exercised through its field examiners 
who examined the books and records of the railroads from time 
to time in much the same way that bank examiners undertook 
their inspections [Henry, 1941, p.379].
From annual reports in this writer’s personal collection, it 
was first seen that some railroads (Chicago & Eastern Illinois 
and Chesapeake & Ohio) had audited financial statements as 
early as 1946, and others still did not have them as late as 1967 
(Southern) or 1968 (Norfolk & Western). Interestingly, Southern 
and Norfolk & Western represented two of the five companies in 
the sample group that survived as solvent, publicly-owned rail-
roads.
5
 Also when the audit opinion was not included, it was ob-
served that the railroad’s financial statements were not marked 
as “unaudited.”
One alternative explanation for not having an audit report 
was considered. It was certainly possible that a railroad’s finan-
cial statements were audited, but that it chose not to disclose 
the audit in the annual report, since it was not required. If this 
actually occurred, it would seem to be irrational behavior by the 
railroad and its management. The cost of the audit would have 
been a significant expense to the railroad, and it would have cost 
virtually nothing more to have included the audit opinion in 
the annual report. Presumably, there would have been a direct 
benefit to the company from the audit in terms of reasonable 
assurance on the reliability of the financial statements, taken as 
a whole, as well as from any management letter comments from 
the CPA firm for improving the railroad’s accounting procedures 
5 Southern and Norfolk & Western were among the last publicly-owned Class 
I railroads. Eventually, the two companies merged in 1982 and shareholders from 
both lines received stock in Norfolk Southern Corporation, a non-rail holding 
company.
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and internal controls. 
By not having an audit, was the railroad saying that the tan-
gible cost of having one exceeded the intangible benefits from 
one? Shareholders too presumably would have benefited from 
audited financial statements, which would have given them a 
potential means of evaluating their own investment decisions 
and reducing the unsystematic risk associated with those deci-
sions. Unfortunately, since there is no depository or central 
source for audit reports, and since the  most of the railroad 
companies involved  are virtually all long out of existence, there 
is no way to verify if, in fact, any audits were made and simply 
not disclosed.
Another analogous situation in another industry has some 
relevance to the railroad audit issue. The U.S. banking industry 
was also long regulated by federal and state governments and 
banks, like railroads, was initially exempted from SEC account-
ing and audit requirements. During the period of study, there 
were both national banks and state chartered banks. National 
banks were regulated by the U.S. Controller of the Currency, 
which conducted regular examinations similar to CPA audits. 
State-chartered banks were regulated by their respective state 
banking departments, and also by the Federal Reserve Bank, 
if they were a member of that organization. Publicly-owned 
national banks or national associations were also not required 
to have audited financial statements in their annual reports 
through the 1960s, although some chose to be audited on a vol-
untary basis.  External CPA audits were not required because it 
was deemed that the examinations conducted
6
 by the Controller 
of the Currency as well as the special Directors’ examinations 
were sufficient. During the period of study, most bank stocks 
traded in the Over-the-Counter market, although some major 
money center banks were listed on the NYSE. It was not till 
1969 that the NYSE adopted a requirement that all banks com-
ing onto the Exchange have audited financial statements.
Hagerman [1972] found it interesting that some banks 
chose voluntarily to be audited, allowing for testing of the value 
of the audit.
7
 He found evidence to suggest that the audit re-
port itself may contain information. However, further analysis 
showed that the audits by CPA firms did not reduce the stock 
price dispersion or increase the liquidity of bank stocks.
6 These audits were conducted on a surprise basis. 
7 This writer was an undergraduate at the University of Rochester when this 
Ph.D. dissertation was written and actually assisted in the data collection.
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This study also identified the outside auditor, when an audit 
was disclosed. During the period of study, the public accounting 
profession was dominated by eight, very large CPA firms. Each 
of the “Big Eight,” as they were then commonly referred to, had 
their own standardized auditing procedures and recommended 
accounting practices.8 Firm procedures and practice played a 
much more important role then because GAAP was not as de-
veloped as it is today, or even 25 years ago. Through technical 
reviews as well as the adherence to certain specialized firm prac-
tices, a CPA firm would be expected to treat the financial state-
ments of two companies in the same industry in the same way. 
As an example, U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel both had the 
same auditor, Price Waterhouse for many years. Bitter [1995, p. 
20] found that the audit certificates issued by Price Waterhouse, 
to both steelmakers, were quite similar over the years. He also 
found that changes made to the two certificates were consistent 
over time and that both companies received exactly the same 
explanatory paragraphs describing uncertainties due to World 
War II in 1942 and 1943. This writer was a party to the discus-
sion that followed the presentation of Bitter’s paper in 1995, and 
in that discussion, it was suggested that Price Waterhouse was 
directly responsible for certain shared accounting procedures 
and disclosures that were observed.
RAILROADS OF INTEREST
Since the organization of the first publicly-owned railroad, 
the Baltimore & Ohio in 1827, more than 9,000 railroad or 
railway companies have been incorporated in the United States 
[Hendy, 1980, p.1]. 
9
 Over the intervening century and decades, 
the number of railroads has declined significantly through 
mergers, bankruptcies, business combinations, and other cor-
porate actions. By 1946, there were 693 railroads in the United 
States of various sizes and types (line-haul, trunk-line, terminal, 
short-line, leased, etc.) of which 137 were designated by the ICC 
as Class I line-haul.10 These are railroads of potential interest 
8 This writer saw this first hand as an auditor for Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co in the mid-1970s.
9 There is no distinction between the words railroad and railway. The terms 
are used interchangeably, though the use of railway predominates in Great Britain 
and Canada. Railroads that emerged from bankruptcy reorganization frequently 
kept the portion of their name that was geographically specific and merely 
changed the railway to railroad or vice versa. Generally, in this paper, the term 
railroad is used.
10 There were actually several Class I terminal railroads during the period 
12
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for this study, in effect those that  represented  the substance 
of the entire industry. As of 1947, Class I railroads operated ap-
proximately 95% of the total railway mileage, handled over 99% 
of the passenger and ton miles, employed 99% of all railway 
workers, and reported 97% of operating revenues for the entire 
industry [AAR Quiz, 1948, #247]. 
SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE RAILROADS
The source for selecting the individual railroads in this 
study was a 1946 publication, entitled Railroads, by Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, the leading stock brokerage 
firm of that time. This 88 page booklet was a research publica-
tion that was distributed to the firm’s customers. It contained 
a wealth of information on the railroad industry as a whole, as 
well as detailed financial and operational data on a number of 
publicly-owned railroads. The depth and breath of this report 
befitted the fact that, in 1946, the railroad industry was still the 
most heavily capitalized in the United States with about $9 bil-
lion in bonds and $8 billion in stock outstanding.11
The Merrill Lynch booklet said that rail securities fall into 
four major groups:
1) Those consistently profitable with high credit stand- 
 ing,
2) Those of relatively good credit and better than aver- 
 age earnings,
3) Marginal or weak companies and,
4) The bankrupt group.
It provided two lists, one of 30 “leading roads” and another of 15 
“additional railroads” without identifying the selection criteria 
for either, and without classifying them into the one of the afore-
mentioned groups. A statement was made that the important 
issues of the big railroad systems trade on the “The Big Board”, 
(the NYSE)  also without identifying the companies that met 
this criteria. Through reference to Schacker [1930], it was deter-
of study; however, in this paper, Class I is taken to exclusively mean line-haul 
railroads.
11 In 1903, there were 116 railroads listed on the NYSE and the total value of 
the rail shares exceeded the total value of all other shares together [Foukle, 1968, 
p. 185]. However, by 1960, the total value of the 80 odd rail stocks traded on the 
NYSE represented just over two percent of the total value of all stocks [Merrill 
Lynch et al., 1960].
13
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mined that 39 of 44 railroads shown on Exhibit 3 were indeed 
listed on the NYSE, including the 35 largest ones.12
EXHIBIT 3
12 One “leading road”, Canadian Pacific, was immediately removed from 
consideration, and not shown on Exhibit 3 because it was not a U.S. company. 
However, it was publicly-owned and its stock was widely held in the U.S., trading 
on the NYSE. The Canadian Pacific filed annual reports with the ICC for its 
operations in Maine and Vermont. 
Selection of Sample Railroads
1945 Operating Revenues 1946 Selected for study
Name of Railroad (nickname)
Reporting 
Mark
NYSE
Listed
in $
millions
% of
total
Cum. %
of total
Leading 
Roads*
Additional 
Railroads RR
Revenues 
from left Comments
PENNSYLVANIA (PENNSY) PRR YES $   936.5 10.5% 10.5% X YES $   936.5
NEW YORK CENTRAL NYC YES 654.4 7.4% 17.9% X YES 654.4
SOUTHERN PACIFIC SP YES 590.3 6.6% 24.5% X YES 590.3
SANTA FE ATSF YES 528.7 5.9% 30.4% X YES 528.7
UNION PACIFIC UP YES 491.9 5.5% 36.0% X YES 491.9
BALTIMORE & OHIO B&O YES 361.4 4.1% 40.0% X YES 361.4
MISSOURI PACIFIC MP YES 289.0 3.2% 43.3% X YES 289.0
SOUTHERN SOU YES 247.5 2.8% 46.1% X YES 247.5
ILLINOIS CENTRAL IC YES 236.9 2.7% 48.7% X YES 236.9
MILWAUKEE ROAD MILW YES 228.9 2.6% 51.3% X YES 228.9
CHESAPEAKE & OHIO
  (CHESSIE)
C&O YES 203.3 2.3% 53.6% X YES 203.3
GREAT NORTHERN GN YES 200.1 2.2% 55.8% X YES 200.1
LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE L&N YES 196.5 2.2% 58.0% X YES 196.5
CHICAGO ROCK ISLAND & 
  PACIFIC (ROCK)
RI YES 
YES
192.0 2.2% 60.2% X YES 192.0
NEW HAVEN NH YES 173.2 1.9% 62.1% X YES 173.2
CHICAGO & NORTH 
  WESTERN
C&NW YES 170.7 1.9% 64.0% X YES 170.7
NORTHERN PACIFIC NP YES 149.2 1.7% 65.7% X YES 149.2
NORFOLK & WESTERN N&W YES 144.9 1.6% 67.3% X YES 144.9
ERIE ERIE YES 139.5 1.6% 68.9% X YES 139.5
ATLANTIC COAST LINE ACL YES 138.7 1.6% 10.5% X YES 138.7
SEABOARD AIR LINE SAL YES 130.2 1.5% 71.9% X YES 130.2
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO
  (FRISCO)
SL-SF YES 116.8 1.3% 73.2% X YES 116.8
READING RDG YES 109.4 1.2% 74.5% X YES 109.4
WABASH WAB YES 91.1 1.0% 75.5% X YES 91.1
NY CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
  (NICKEL PLATE)
NKP YES 85.6 1.0% 76.5% X YES 85.6
MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS 
  (KATY)
MKT YES 83.1 0.9% 77.4% X YES 83.1
BOSTON & MAINE B&M YES 82.3 0.9% 78.3% X CONTROLLED BY MEC
DELAWARE & HUDSON D&H YES 79.3 0.9% 79.2% X INCLUDES COAL MINING 
BUSINESSES
DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
  WESTERN
D&RGW YES 78.3 0.9% 80.1% X EMERGED FROM BANK-
RUPTCY 1947 AFTER 
MERGER w/DSL
LEHIGH VALLEY LV YES 77.7 0.9% 81.0% X CONTROLLED BY PRR
TEXAS & PACIFIC T&P YES 75.5 0.8% 81.8% X CONTROLLED BY MP
DELAWARE LACKAWANNA 
  & WESTERN
DL&W YES 72.2 0.8% 82.6% X MERGED WITH ERIE 1960
WESTERN PACIFIC WP YES 60.6 0.7% 83.3% X YES 60.6
PERE MARQUETTE PM YES 51.5 0.6% 83.9% X ACQUIRED BY C%O 
IN 1947
GULF MOBILE & OHIO GM&O YES 38.1 0.4% 84.3% X YES 38.1
PITTSBURGH & LAKE ERIE P&LE NO 30.7 0.3% 84.7% X CONTROLLED BY NYC
CHICAGO & EASTERN 
  ILLINOIS
C&EI YES 29.7 0.3% 85.0% X YES 29.7
CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN CGW YES 29.4 0.3% 85.3% X ACQUIRED BY C&NW 
IN 1968
VIRGINIAN VGN NO 28.3 0.3% 85.6% X ACQUIRED BY N&W 1960
MAINE CENTRAL MEC NO 20.8 0.2% 85.9% X CONTROLLED BY B&M
ALABAMA GREAT 
  SOUTHERN
AGS NO 19.6 0.2% 86.1% X CONTROLLED BY SOU
ILLINOIS TERMINAL ITC NO 10.8 0.1% 86.2% X TERMINAL & INTERUR-
BAN LINE
BANGOR & AROOSTOOK BAR YES 10.5 0.1% 86.3% X YES 10.5
PITTSBURGH & WEST 
  VIRGINIA
P&WV YES 6.6 0.1% 86.4% X CONTROLLED BY
PENNROAD CORP., LATER 
LEASED BY N&W
TOTAL for 44 RRs $  7,691.7 29 15 30 $  7,028.7
TOTAL FOR ALL CLASS I $  8,902.3 70.0%
SOURCE:  Railroads [Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 1946]
* Excludes Canadian Pacific Railway
Reporting Mark of Selected Railroads in BOLD
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Starting with the list of “leading roads”, the objective was to 
select 30 railroads for study. Thirty was thought to be a manage-
able number that would theoretically provide for 900 distinct 
observations over the 30 year period, but only if the selected 
railroads lasted through the entire period of study. However, one 
should be concerned that the inclusion or exclusion of a particular 
railroad might unduly influence the results. The railroads that 
were selected were all listed on the NYSE and came primarily 
from Merrill Lynch’s list of “leading roads.” Certain railroads were 
eliminated from consideration because of control issues, as wells 
other changes in corporate structure or business operations.  
 The 30 selected railroads, as shown on Exhibit 3, were ones 
with both public recognition and longevity, and were diverse in 
terms of their size and their geographic locale with eight from 
the East, seven from the South, nine from the Midwest, two 
from the Northwest, two from the Southwest, and two from the 
West. With consideration of the resultant mergers, acquisitions, 
bankruptcies, and conversions to non-rail holding companies, 
the 30 selected railroads actually provided for a total of 691 
unique company-year observations during the 30-year period of 
study as shown in Exhibit 4.
EXHIBIT 4
Status of Sample Railroads from 1946 to 1975
Railroad
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
# OF 
YEARS 
AS RR*
PRR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M I B B B B B B 21
NYC Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M I B B B B B B 21
SP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I 23
ATSF Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I 22
UP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I 23
B&O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M M M M M M M I I I 19
MP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 30
SOU Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 30
IC Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I I I I I I I 17
MILW Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I 26
C&O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I 27
GN Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M I I I I I I 23
L&N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I 25
RI Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y B 29
NH Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 15
C&NW Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I I 22
NP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M I I I I I I 23
N&W Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 30
ERIE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M M M M M M M M M M M B B B B 14
ACL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M I I I I I I I 21
SAL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M I I I I I I I 21
SL-SF Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 30
RDG Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y B B B B B 25
WAB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M M M M M M M M M M M 18
NKP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M M M M M M M M M M M 18
MKT Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I I 22
WP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I 25
GM&O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y M M M M 26
C&EI Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 30
BAR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 15
# OF RRs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 29 27 27 26 24 23 23 19 16 12 12 9 7 6 6 5 691
KEY: Y = PUBLICLY-OWNED RAILROAD M = MERGED B = BANKRUPT I = INDUSTRY/NON-RAIL HOLDING CO.
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The 30 selected railroads represented approximately 79% 
of the total Class I revenue for 1945. The sample group included 
the largest railroad in the country as measured by revenues, a 
good proxy for size and public recognition, plus several smaller 
roads as well. While only five members of the group survived 
as solvent, publicly-owned railroads  till the end of the period 
of study, the average railroad was included for approximately 
23 (out of the 30) years. Only seven railroads were included for 
less than 20 years, and these included the first two railroads that 
converted their public form of ownership to a non-rail, holding 
company structure.  
As it turned out, even with the benefit of hindsight, it would 
have been impossible to find 20 or even 15 Class I railroads 
that survived as publicly-owned railroads from 1946 until 1975. 
However, even if this were possible, it would not have been de-
sirable.  The behavior of such a group would have likely been 
more homogeneous, but, at the same time, not representative of 
the railroad industry as a whole during this period. By includ-
ing railroads that merged, those that were acquired by other 
railroads, those that converted to non-rail holding companies, 
those that went bankrupt, etc., the sample group is indeed quite 
representative of this industry during the period of study.
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
A total of 401 disclosed (complete) audits were observed for 
the sample group during the 1946 to 1975 period. This means 
that (complete) audits occurred in approximately 58% of the 
691 possible company-year situations. However, there was con-
siderable range in the findings. While the average railroad had 
approximately 13 audits during the period, four railroads were 
never audited for any of the years in which they were part of the 
sample group.  Pennsylvania Railroad was the largest company 
within the sample group in terms of revenue, and also had the 
most shareholders, a number which peaked in 1946 with almost 
219,000. Yet, there was never any presentation of audited finan-
cial statements in its annual reports during this period. Neither 
the Santa Fe nor the Illinois Central also disclosed any audits, 
and they were also major railroads, being the fifth and ninth 
largest in terms of 1945 revenue. The Santa Fe was a well-run 
and very profitable railroad. The Illinois Central was consis-
tently profitable, and notably was the second railroad from the 
sample group to convert to a non-rail holding company (IC In-
dustries) in 1963.
16
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Union Pacific Railroad had only two complete audits in 
1967 and 1968, and these were the years immediately before it 
converted to Union Pacific Corp., a non-rail holding company. 
On the other hand, nine railroads were audited for all the years 
they were included in the sample group. Two railroads, Mis-
souri Pacific and Frisco were each audited for the entire 30-year 
period. Interestingly, Price Waterhouse was the auditor in both 
cases. Seven others were audited for all of the years they existed 
as solvent, publicly-owned railroads. Six of the seven railroads 
eventually left the sample group because of mergers or conver-
sion to a non-rail holding company. For example, Katy, one of 
the smaller railroads in the sample group, was audited for 22 
consecutive years beginning in 1946. It left the group after 1967 
when it created Katy Industries, a non-rail holding corporation, 
as its public form of ownership. The seventh railroad in this 
sub- group was the Rock Island, which went bankrupt in 1975. 
  It was observed that two railroads (Reading and Gulf 
Mobile & Ohio) did not have their first audit until 1962. Nor-
folk & Western was the last railroad remaining in the sample 
group to be audited and that did not occur until 1969! From 
1969 through 1975, all of the remaining railroads, in the (albeit) 
smaller group, voluntarily presented audited financial state-
ments in their public annual reports. 
It should be noted that, for certain years, three railroads 
disclosed that limited audit procedures were performed. For 
16 years (1952 to 1967), Santa Fe presented subsidiary finan-
cial statements, audited by Price Waterhouse, in an appendix. 
At first, these statements were just wholly-owned subsidiaries, 
but later they were expanded to include all of its controlled af-
filiated companies. These companies were engaged in real estate 
development, oil and gas operations and uranium mining. They 
also included several non-operating railroads. There was no 
indication as to why separate audits were performed, but clearly 
most of these subsidiaries were outside of the ICC’s control. 
Sometimes companies were required by their banks to have 
audits, but that does not seem to be the case here as Santa Fe 
was free of bank debt for most of the period. In many of these 
years, Santa Fe mentioned that Price Waterhouse made unan-
nounced inspections of cash, stocks, bonds and other securities 
in the custody of the Lines’ officers. However, at no time were 
any audited financial statements presented for either the parent 
company, or for the consolidated Santa Fe System.  
Gulf Mobile & Ohio presented an audited balance sheet in 
just 1952, which was ten years before it presented a full set of 
17
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audited financial statements. Finally from 1958 to 1967, Union 
Pacific presented audited statements for its wholly owned non-
rail affiliates, and also disclosed that there had been audits of 
the railroad’s cash and securities. This practice mimicked those 
of Santa Fe, but these two railroads had little in common. One 
could question the value of limited audit procedures or audits of 
just minor parts of these businesses, particular since Santa Fe 
and Union Pacific were among the five largest railroads in terms 
of revenue. In both cases the reported audits of their affiliated 
non-rail subsidiaries stopped in the late 1960s. For Santa Fe, it 
was stopped in 1968 by its conversion to Santa Fe Industries, 
which was a non-rail holding company. Union Pacific stopped 
the practice in 1967 when it presented a complete set of audited 
consolidated financial statements. This was two years before 
Union Pacific Railroad Company converted its public form of 
ownership to (non-rail) Union Pacific Corp., and left the sample 
group. 
Two railroads that presented audited financial statements 
also presented audited statements of available net income. For 
Chicago & North Western, this practice was observed from 1956 
to 1967 after which it left the sample group. Each year its audi-
tors, Arthur Andersen & Co., provided a separate audit opinion 
stating that the accompanying statement fairly presents “Avail-
able Net Income” in accordance with the terms of the first and 
second mortgages as amended. 
For Milwaukee Road, this practice was observed from 1948 
to 1964, but the audit opinion was handled in a slightly differ-
ent way. Milwaukee Road produced a statement of available net 
income each year as required by the provisions of its first mort-
gage and general mortgages indentures.  The remaining amount 
shown on these statements was available for the payment of 
dividends or for any other “proper” corporate purposes.  How-
ever, its auditors, Ernst & Ernst at first and later Peat Marwick, 
opined on the statement of available net income as part of their 
accountants’ reports covering the normal financial statements, 
rather than in a separate opinion. It was interesting to note 
that the auditor’s opinion on available net income stopped in 
1965, which was the first year that Milwaukee Road presented 
consolidated financial statements. Its consolidated balance sheet 
for 1965 showed that over $130 million of mortgage bonds were 
still outstanding, and the annual report included a statement 
of available net income without any indication that it was un-
audited, or any discussion as to why this audit was apparently 
discontinued. Milwaukee Road continued to present statements 
18
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 40 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss1/2
19Feeney, Railroad Audits
of available net income in its annual shareholder reports up 
through 1967.
There is some suggestion that the number of audits ob-
served could be less than the actual number performed. It seems 
incredible, but possible, that in certain years a railroad could 
have been audited without disclosing this fact in its shareholder 
reports. Consider Bangor & Aroostook, which was audited by 
Haskins & Sells from 1948 to 1950, 1957, and again in 1960. 
What happened in the intervening years?  Is it possible that 
the audits were continued and were merely not disclosed be-
cause there was no requirement to do so?  Haskins & Sells was 
seemingly engaged here as its auditor over a 13 year period, 
albeit perhaps not continuously. Yet, it was found that Bangor 
& Aroostook’s annual reports from 1928 to 1945 each included 
an audit report from Haskins & Sells.13 External factors such 
as bank lending requirements do not seem to have affected 
this situation because it had no bank debt during this period. 
The 1960 audit was in the last annual report for the Bangor & 
Aroostook Railroad, and seemed to be a facilitating step in the 
railroad’s conversion to a non-rail holding company at the end 
of that same year.
A balance sheet audit of Gulf Mobile & Ohio in 1952 was 
performed by Price Waterhouse, which was the same firm that 
began to conduct the full audits ten years later.  Again, was it is 
possible that the Gulf Mobile & Ohio continued to employ Price 
Waterhouse’s services during this period and merely did not 
disclose the results. The separate audits of affiliates disclosed 
for many years by Union Pacific were conducted by Haskins & 
Sells, which was the same firm used for complete audits in 1967 
and 1968.  Could it be that Haskins & Sells audited Union Pa-
cific as well during this period, but it was not disclosed because 
it was not required? Given that there is no centralized source 
containing the audit reports for this period from the then Big 
Eight CPA firms, it would be virtually impossible to determine if 
such audits occurred but were not disclosed.  
Perhaps the most interesting situation involves Pennsylva-
nia Railroad (PRR), which had no reported audits. Salisbury 
[1982] said that Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co was hired in 1959 
to perform a special study of the PRR’s accounting and budget-
ing systems.14 At the time, Peat Marwick was the world’s largest 
13 This was the earliest report that could be located.
14 There was not mention of this in its annual reports. PRR’s 1963 annual 
report talked about the modernization of accounting saying that it had initiated a 
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accounting and auditing firm, but that is not why it was selected 
for this role. Peat Marwick was already the auditor of the New 
York Central, and the PRR’s CFO was looking ahead to their 
planned merger. The CFO thought that having a common audi-
tor would serve the needs and interests of both railroads. Sals-
bury went on to say [p. 52] that, prior to the selection of Peat 
Marwick, no independent CPA firm had ever routinely audited 
the PRR’s books. This seems to imply that Peat Marwick did au-
dit the PRR in the 1960s, and if so, then it begs the question why 
these audits were not included in its annual reports. 
It is interesting to note that Peat Marwick did eventually 
become the auditor of Penn Central Co., the ill-fated merger of 
PRR and New York Central. However, there was no audit report 
in the Penn Central’s first annual report, which was issued in 
March 1968 for calendar year 1967 on a pooling-of-interests 
basis. PRR and New York Central did not actually merge until 
February 1, 1968. Penn Central included Peat Marwick audit re-
ports in its 1968 and 1969 annual reports, but each audit opinion 
covered only one year. The reason for this was that the reporting 
company was different in 1967 vs. 1968 vs. 1969. In1967, the an-
nual report was actually issued by Pennsylvania New York Cen-
tral Transportation Co., the legal name of the merged railroad, 
for which audited financial statements would not have been re-
quired. For both 1968 and 1969, the annual report was issued by 
the Penn Central Co. In 1968, Penn Central Co. was adopted as 
the new name for the merged railroad, but later in 1969 the same 
name was applied to a newly-formed, non-rail holding company 
while the merged railroad was renamed the Penn Central Trans-
portation Co.  Accordingly, an audit would have been required 
for 1969, but not for 1968. Hence,  the 1968 audit  was volun-
tarily presented, but was  not included in the results of this study.
Exhibit 5 shows that the percentage of railroads in the sam-
ple group that were audited increased steadily during the period 
of study. With an increase of three audits in 1956, the percent-
age audited finally exceeded 50%. From that point on, a larger 
and larger percentage of the (remaining) railroads were audited. 
The absolute number of audits declined as various railroads left 
the sample group. By 1969, the remaining stalwart (Norfolk & 
Western) was probably hard pressed to justify not being audited, 
and finally submitted to an audit.
system of responsibility budgeting and reporting. Its 1964 annual report said that 
responsibility accounting and reporting had been extended to all functions of the 
company, and it had begun to unify property accounting with the new system.
20
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EXHIBIT 5
Southern Railway was the next to last of the audit hold-
outs.  Its first audit performed in 1968 by Price Waterhouse. The 
President’s Letter to the Shareholders in Southern’s 1968 annual 
report explained the change in audit policy.  It said [p. 3] that, 
prior to 1968, Southern Railway had “not had its consolidated 
financial results audited except to the extent of examinations 
of the individual railroads’ accounts by the ICC, and audits by 
outside accountants of certain subsidiary companies.” It is not 
clear why Southern would have had certain subsidiaries audited 
while others were not, but this seems to be similar to the situa-
tion observed with Santa Fe and Union Pacific. Perhaps the only 
subsidiaries that were audited were those outside of the ICC’s 
control. However, while the Santa Fe and Union Pacific gener-
ally disclosed the audits of their non-rail subsidiaries, Southern 
never did.
The Southern Railway System had long consisted of a 
large number of companies including several reporting Class I 
railroads, about 20 Class II railroads and about 30 other com-
panies. These numbers exclude another 20 terminal railroads 
and other companies in which Southern had shared ownership, 
usually with other Class I railroads.  The President’s letter in 
the 1968 annual report further said that an independent audit 
was not required by law, but was deemed by the directors to be 
useful and valuable to both the shareholders’ and Company’s 
interest. It also said an audit was in accordance (perhaps giving 
increased comparability) with the accounting practices required 
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of companies subject to control by the SEC. However, the letter 
failed to note that Southern was not subject to the SEC’s control 
and that the Southern was among the last publicly held Class I 
railroads to have an audit.  
It was felt to be important that the graph in Exhibit 5 show 
both the percentage of railroads that were audited and the num-
ber of railroads audited each year. The reason for this is that af-
ter 1959 the actual number of railroads remaining in the sample 
group steadily decreased due to conversions to non-rail, holding 
companies, mergers, and bankruptcies. This is shown by the 
scale on the left column of the graph. Had the actual number 
of annual audits been shown, it would have increased from ten 
in 1946 to a maximum of 20 in 1963 before declining back to a 
handful in 1973 to 1975. 
Exhibit 6 shows that virtually all the 401 (complete) audits 
were performed by Big Eight firms. Furthermore, one of the 
smaller firms shown had long been associated with one Big 
Eight firm and later merged with that firm. The table shows just 
three firms (Haskins & Sells, Peat Marwick and Price Water-
house) collectively conducted approximately 91% of these audits 
and in fairly similar proportions. Both Price Waterhouse and 
Peat Marwick performed audits throughout the entire period of 
study. Price Waterhouse performed the most audits (124) while 
Peat Marwick had the largest number in a single year, nine in 
1963. The railroads audited by Peat Marwick were located in the 
East and Midwest; Price Waterhouse’s railroad clients were all in 
the Midwest.  
Haskins & Sells performed the second highest number of 
audits from those observed. Their audits were performed from 
1948 through 1970 and were primarily done on southern and 
western railroads, except for the tiny Bangor & Aroostook in 
northern New England. Interestingly, the New York City office of 
Haskins & Sells conducted the audits of Louisville & Nashville, 
Atlantic Coast Line and Seaboard Air line throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s. However, these three railroads were long linked by 
inter-company ownership such that the choice of a common au-
ditor may not be surprising.15 Ernst & Ernst and Arthur Anders-
en both performed their last audit on a member of the sample in 
1967. Arthur Young’s only railroad audit of a group member was 
15 It was quite common for one railroad to own stock in other railroads 
especially that of its preferred interchange partners. Through the period of study, 
the American Association of Railroads regularly reported that about one- third of 
railroad Class I stock was owned by other railroads in its annual yearbook.   
22
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 40 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss1/2
23Feeney, Railroad Audits
done on Western Pacific in 1970, which was the last year it was 
included in the sample group; it converted to a non-rail holding 
company the following year.
EXHIBIT 6
The railroads and their auditors appeared to have had 
long-term relationships.  Exhibit 7 shows that only nine audi-
tor changes were observed during the 30-year period. Twenty 
railroads had just one auditor; four had two auditors, one had 
two changes for a total of three auditors, and Chicago & Eastern 
Illinois had three changes for a total of four auditors. Recall that 
four railroads never presented any audited financial statements 
during the sample period.
Several of the auditor changes can be easily explained. In 
1968, Great Northern switched from Peat Marwick to Haskins & 
Sells and it appears that this was done in preparation of a pend-
ing merger. In March of 1970, Great Northern, Northern Pacific, 
Chicago Burlington & Quincy, and Spokane Portland & Seattle 
all merged to create the Burlington Northern Railroad, which 
became the country’s largest railroad in terms of track mileage. 
This merger was accounted for as a pooling-of-interest, and the 
Audits Performed on Sample Railroads from 1946-1975
by CPA Firm
Big Eight Firms in Italics n %
Most in 
single year
Price Waterhouse 124 31% 6
Haskins & Sells 121 30% 7
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co 118 29% 9
Arthur Anderson 19 5% 2
Ernst & Ernst 15 4% 1
Swanson, Ogilvie & McKenzie 2 0% 1
Arthur Young 1 0% 1
Delotte, Plender & Griffins* 1 0% 1
totals 401 100% n/a
* This firm began collaborating with Haskins & Sells in 1905 and the 
  two firms actually merged in 1978.
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first annual report for the merged entity was actually issued for 
1969, and contained consolidated financial statements audited by 
Haskins & Sells, which had previously audited Northern Pacific.
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Baltimore & Ohio hired Peat Marwick as its auditor in 
1961, just as it came under control of Chesapeake & Ohio, 
which had long used the same firm. Chicago & Eastern Illinois 
switched from Arthur Andersen to Price Waterhouse in 1967 
at a time it was developing a relationship with Missouri Pa-
cific, which also used that CPA firm. Erie’s first audit in 1956 
was performed by Haskins & Sells who also audited Delaware 
Lackawanna & Western, which merged with Erie in 1960 form-
ing Erie-Lackawanna. Norfolk & Western chose Peat Marwick to 
be its first auditor in 1969 and this was probably also the result 
of an affiliated relationship.16 For many years, PRR owned a 
substantial interest in Norfolk & Western and its officers served 
on Norfolk & Western’s board of directors. As previously men-
tioned, PRR’s relationship with Peat Marwick resulted in it later 
serving as the first auditor of Penn Central, which in retrospect 
probably wishes it had not.
The study looked at the various types of audit reports issued 
during the period of study. Although the accounting profession 
itself became more developed (Zeff, 1984) and the wording of 
the standard accountants’ report changed during the period of 
study, it was still possible to summarize the reports observed 
into four groups. These included an unqualified (clean) opinion 
and three types of qualified opinions as shown in Exhibit 8.
EXHIBIT 8
It seemed appropriate to group the different types of audit 
reports into four time periods as the year-by-year results were 
less important, and also there was some homogeneity within the 
periods. Unqualified opinions provide the most assurance, but 
16 This auditor/client relationship has turned out to be very long-lived.  In the 
proxy accompanying its 2002 annual report, Norfolk Southern, noted that KPMG 
and its predecessor firm (Peat Marwick) have audited Norfolk Southern and one 
of its predecessor  (Norfolk & Western) since 1969.  
Types of Audit Opinions during these Periods
1946-1955 1956-1960 1961-1969 1970-1975 TOTALS % of Total
Except for 23 16 136 33 208 52%
Unqualified 87 59 15 8 169 42%
Consistency 0 9 2 4 15 4%
Subject to 8 0 0 1 9 2%
totals 118 84 153 46 401 100%
29% 21% 38% 11% 100%
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these were issued in only 42% of the audits. This is probably a 
much lower percentage than what would have been observed for 
audits of industrial or commercial companies during the same 
era. Recognize of course, that only 58% of the railroad annual re-
ports reviewed were audited, while all of the annual reports from 
publicly-owned, industrial or commercial companies would have 
been audited. The except for opinions were issued for several rea-
sons, most notably for the railroads’ treatment of deferred taxes, 
elements of investment, depreciation, as well as, the uncertainty 
of future certain events. The audit reports labeled as consistency 
were special cases of except for opinions when an accounting 
change was made, but the audit report was otherwise unqualified. 
Subject to opinions were functionally the same as except for and 
only appeared at the start of the period of study. Also observed, 
but not affecting the type of opinion issued, were that the audit 
reports frequently contained additional explanatory paragraphs.  
The type of audit report issued was related to the basis of 
accounting that was employed. All of the unqualified opinions 
issued prior to 1956 were for annual reports when the railroad’s 
financial statements followed ICC accounting. One would think 
that since the railroad was already filing with the ICC on this 
basis, it would have been relatively easy to have its auditor opine 
on that. This is supported by the findings as approximately 73% 
of the audits performed through 1955 were unqualified. The ex-
cept for opinions prior to 1961 were essentially from just three 
railroads: Milwaukee Road, Missouri Pacific and Chicago & 
North Western. The handful of subject to opinions was related 
to just four railroads. The consistency opinions in the second 
time period primarily were issued for 1956 and 1957 when the 
ICC and the railroads made several changes in their accounting 
and disclosure requirements. The one audit opinion in the 1970-
1975 period was because of going concerns for Rock Island in 
1974. It went bankrupt for the third time in 1975.
In terms of audit opinions, 1961 represented a watershed 
year. There were 16 audit opinions issued that year and all were 
stated in terms of GAAP, but included an explanatory paragraph 
saying the railroads were required to maintain their accounts in 
conformity with ICC accounting that differed in certain respects 
from GAAP. In fact, the wording of the explanatory paragraphs 
was virtually identical, meaning that the AICPA was involved 
in this change. After 1961, the audit opinions were solely based 
upon GAAP with the result that it was much harder to receive an 
unqualified opinion. This can be seen by the largest increase in 
except for opinions in the third time period. From 1968 to 1972, 
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only except for opinions were issued.
After 1972, the few railroads remaining in the sample group 
each eventually switched to GAAP accounting. This change in 
accounting change was noted in the auditor’s opinion because 
it caused a consistency issue in the year of change. All five of 
the remaining sample railroads received unqualified opinions in 
1975, which was the last year of this study.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The paper shows the extent to which railroads voluntarily 
submit to annual audits by CPA firms. This was one area where 
there was a dramatic overall change. In 1946, only one-third of 
the sample group was audited, but by 1970 it was 100% audited. 
On average, the selected railroads were audited slightly more 
than half of the time. There does not seem that external factors 
mandated the audits, except for two railroads where the audits 
may have been related to specific mortgage covenants. Accord-
ingly, these railroads had a choice to be audited or not. To the 
extent that a railroad chose to be audited in the late 1940s or 
early 1950s, it was seemingly a voluntary decision. A decade lat-
er, the decision to be audited was probably more closely related 
to conforming to the then prevailing industry practice. 
It was not until 1956 that the sample railroads were more like-
ly to be audited than not. By 1969, all of the railroads remaining in 
the sample group presented audited financial statements annually, 
and this practice continued until 1976 when the few remaining, 
publicly-owned railroads were required to fully comply with the 
SEC’s accounting and auditing requirements. Accordingly, the im-
pact of the requiring an audit under SEC rules was largely moot.
In terms of the sample group, the largest railroads were the 
least likely to have an audit. However, this is very misleading as 
these same railroads were the most likely to leave the sample group 
to become a non-rail holding company for which an audit would 
have been required. Most of the railroads that were audited volun-
tarily had low to moderate leverage and return-on-average assets. 
During much of the period of study, the accounting profes-
sion was dominated by eight CPA firms, the so called “The Big 
Eight”. However, an even smaller number of these firms served 
the accounting and auditing needs of the railroad industry. 
Three firms together performed 91% of the audits, while no 
single CPA firm dominated the railroad industry audits. Specific 
firm audit reports were similarly worded and mentioned similar 
accounting issues e.g., the treatment of depreciation and of de-
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ferred income taxes. 
This study also provided evidence of an early audit in 1898 
for the Reading Railroad and two related lines, which was not 
previously disclosed in the literature. A further review of rail-
road annual reports from the end the 19th century could pos-
sibly identify yet earlier audits or validate the significance of this 
finding. The difficulty here is easily locating annual reports from 
this era for review.
REFERENCES 
Adler, D. (1970), British Investment in American Railways 1834-1898 ( Charlot-
teville: The University of Virginia Press), Hidy, M. (ed.). 
Allston, F. (1992), Conglomerate, (Naperville, IL: Illumina Concepts).
Association of American Railroads (AAR) (1948), Quiz on Railroads and Rail-
roading, 8th edition.
Bitter, M. (1995), Bethlehem Steel: A Content Analysis of its 1921-1958 Annual 
Reports, Published in the Collected Abstracts for the American Accounting As-
sociation Northeast Regional Conference, Philadelphia PA, March.
Boockholdt, J. (1978), “Influence of Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century 
Railroad Accounting on the Development of Modern Accounting Theory, 
The Accounting Historians Journal, Spring. Vol. 5, No 1, 9-26. 
Brief, R. (1986), ed., Corporate Financial Reporting and Analysis in the Early 
1900s, Accounting Thought and Practice through the Years Series, (New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc.).
Chatfield, M. and R. Vangermeersch (1966), ed. , The History of Accounting: An 
International Encyclopedia, (New York: Garland Publishing), s.v. “NYSE” by 
R. Vangermeersch.
Cochrane, G. (1984), “The Auditors Report: Its Evolution on the U.S.A.” in The 
Evolution of Corporate Financial Reporting (New York: Garland Publishing, 
Inc.), Lee, T. and R. Parker (ed.).
Coyle, J., Bard, E.  and Cavinato, J. (1986), Transportation, 2nd. edn. (St. Paul, 
MN: West Publishing Company).
Feeney, K. (2004), Railroad Annual Reports in the Post World War II era (1946-
1975): A Study in Voluntary Compliance, D.P.S. Dissertation, Pace University. 
Foulke, R. (1968), Practical Financial Statement Analysis, 6th. edn. (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Company).
Hagerman, R. (1972), Government Regulation of Bank Financial Reporting: An 
Empirical Investigation, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Rochester.
Hendy, A. (1980), American Railroad Stock Certificates, (London UK: Stanley Gib-
bons Publications Ltd).
Henry, R. (1942), This Fascinating Railroad Business, (New York: The Bobs-
Merrill Company).
King, D. (1998), “The Changing Format of the United States Audit Report Re-
sponding to Stakeholder Needs and Wants,” Published in the Collected Ab-
stracts for the Fifth Charles Waldo Haskins Accounting History Seminar - The 
Evolution of Business Disclosures, Academy of Accounting Historians, No-
vember 12-14 in Atlanta, Ga.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane (1946), Railroads.
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (1938) “Historical Account of Relationship 
of NYSE with Listed Companies as it affects Accountants,” document dated 
28
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 40 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss1/2
29Feeney, Railroad Audits
April 8, by P. West (Director of the Department of Stock List).
----- (1969), Letter from W. R. Satterfield (Assistant Director of the Department 
of Stock List) to R. Vangermeersch, May 27.
----- (2004), “NYSE Timeline”, accessed February 28, 2004 from http://www.nyse.
com/about/timeline/1047054055330.html.
Previts, G. and Merino, B. (1998), A History of Accountancy in the United States 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press).
Previts, G. and Samson, W.  (2000), “Exploring the Content of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroads Annual Reports: 1827-1856”, The Accounting Historian Jour-
nal, June, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1-42. 
Railway Systems and Management Association (RSMA) (1967), The Railroad 
Treasurer in a Changing Money Market, September. 
Salsbury, S. (1982), No Way to Run a Railroad (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company).
Schabacker, R. (1930), Stock Market Theory and Practice (New York: B.C. Forbes 
Publishing Company).
Zeff, S. (1984), “Some Junctures in the Evolution of the Process of Establishing 
Accounting Principles in the U.S.A.: 1917-1972”, The Accounting Review, 
Vol. 59, No. 3, 447-468.
APPENDIX
Timeline of Major Events Impacting Specialized Railroad 
Accounting Practices and Annual Reports
1827 First publicly owned railroad - B&0
1828 First B&O  annual report
1837 Virginia - first state to require summary accounting data
1876 Supreme Court uphold granger laws Munn v. Illinois
1879 Convention of State Railroad Commissioners
1886 Supreme Court stops state regulation of interest com-
merce - Wabash v. Illinois
1887 ICC established - requires annual reporting of railroads
1891 First use of current assets/liabilities in PRR annual re-
port
1893 Panic hits railroad industry particularly hard - eventu-
ally 37% go broke
1898 Reading’s first annual report is audited
1900 B&O  has audited financial statements
1901 Baltimore Ohio issues 75th annual report
1906 Hepburn Act allows ICC to prescribe uniform chart of 
accounts
1914 Valuation Act directs ICC to value all assets used by rail-
roads
1914 ICC issues Accounting Classification for Steam Railroads
1916 Railroad mileage peaks;  first Federal highway aid
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1917 USRA seizes control of railroads during WWI
1920 Transportation Act gives ICC control over railroad secu-
rities
1920 URSA returns railroads to corporate control
1923 ICC proposes depreciation for all assets
1926 ICC orders depreciation for track structures and then 
backs off
1929 Start of Great Depression - eventually 28% of railroad 
mileage in bankruptcy
1931 ICC orders depreciation for track structures and then 
backs off
1932 ICC  orders and then suspends depreciation for all assets 
on straight line basis 
1933 Securities Act creates SEC to control securities- railroad 
securities exempt
1934 Securities Act creates annual reporting requirements- 
railroads exempted
1943 ICC orders depreciation  on track and roadbed
1943 ICC issues Uniform System of Accounts for Steam Rail-
roads
1945 End of World War II; form of railroad annual reports 
begins to change
1946 PRR  issues its 100th annual report
1947 Start of Modern Merger Era
1954 New Internal Revenue code
1956 AICPA forms Committee of Relations with ICC
1960 Bangor & Aroostock Railroad becomes Bangor & Aroos-
tock Corp.
1968 Merger of PRR  and NYC forming Penn Central 
1970 Merger of GN, NP, CB&Q and SP&S forming  Burling-
ton Northern
1970 Penn Central Bankruptcy 
1971 Amtrak takes over inter-city passenger service
1975 Last year  railroad accounting allowed in shareholder 
annual reports
1976 Conrail takes over operation of 10 bankrupt eastern car-
riers
1976 4R Act  gives SEC authority to prescribe railroad ac-
counting and reporting rules
1983 FASB issues SFAS 83  on changes in Accounting for RR 
Track Structures
1992 Last annual report from a Class I railroad - Consolidated 
Rail Corp. (Conrail)
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